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Abstract. The trustworthiness of any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
rests upon the expectations for trust, and the degree to which those ex-
pectations are met. Policies, whether implicit as in PGP and SDSI/SPKI
or explicitly required as in X.509, document expectations for trust in a
PKI. The widespread use of X.509 in the context of global e-Science
infrastructures, financial institutions, and the U.S. Federal government
demands efficient, transparent, and reproducible policy decisions. Since
current manual processes fall short of these goals, we designed, built,
and tested computational tools to process the citation schemes of X.509
certificate policies defined in RFC 2527 and RFC 3647. Our PKI Policy
Repository, PolicyBuilder, and PolicyReporter improve the consistency
of certificate policy operations as actually practiced in compliance au-
dits, grid accreditation, and policy mapping for bridging PKIs. Anecdotal
and experimental evaluation of our tools on real-world tasks establishes
their actual utility and suggests how machine-actionable policy might
empower individuals to make informed trust decisions in the future.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental purpose of PKI is to allow relying parties to trust users based
upon a set of credentials the user has proven they have control over. Confidence in
these user credentials requires the relying party to evaluate the trustworthiness of
an association between a public key and one or more attributes. These attributes
may serve to identify a person, machine, or organization, or they may simply
associate an arbitrary property with a public key.
Foundations for Trust in a X.509 PKI In X.509, these associations are
expressed in a machine-actionable document called a certificate and a certificate
authority (CA) attests to the validity of these associations. The certificate policy
(CP) of an organization contains a set of expectations that define its notion
of a trustworthy public key certificate and how it may be used. The Certifica-
tion Practices Statement (CPS) states how a CA actually implements a CP. In
principle, the trustworthiness of a certificate is a function of the similarity of
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stated policy to personal trust expectations (measured in the Policy Compari-
son process) and the similarity of stated policy to actual practice (Compliance
Audit).
Evaluating the similarity of policies depends upon the comparison of CPs.
Ideally users should evaluate trusted roots based on their personal expectations.
In actual practice, the average user blindly adopts the trust expectations of their
employers, application vendors, or of companies like Thawte and VeriSign. Until
user-friendly policy becomes a reality, requirements for trust will continue to be
expressed for organizations, by organizations.
Currently, people manually compare the two policies involved, reading both
documents line by line. Bridge CAs relieve organizations of much of this burden,
employing this same manual process to establish trust relationships between
member organizations. Bridge CAs attest that the expectations of trust for all
of its member organizations are logically consistent. If a member organization
issues a certificate, that certificate is viewed as trustworthy among all members
of the bridge at a predetermined level of assurance [17].
A policy is probably useless unless it is followed in practice. Compliance
audits determine whether a CA issues certificates according to a CP in actual
practice. Federations and bridges ensure that the requirements for trust are met
through such audits, whether for accreditation or cross-certification respectively.
For example, the current approach to accreditation at the International Grid
Trust Federation (IGTF) defines a mostly manual process; one step involves
Policy Management Authority (PMA) members reviewing a CP in detail, com-
paring its contents against requirements in an authentication profile (AP) [18].
Auditing PKIs within financial institutions also involves following a manual pro-
cess described in ISO 21188 [19] [22]. Cross-certification, the operation necessary
to establish a bridge, similarly requires comparing CPs.
We claim that informed trust decisions should be based on processes that
consistently estimate actual organizational behavior. Consistent processes occur
frequently in a manner transparent to the user; their results are both repro-
ducible and auditable. Currently-practiced, manual CP operations are costly,
time-consuming, lack end-user transparency, and are difficult to reproduce. We
claim that computationally processing machine-actionable certificate policies
would be more efficient and consistent.
Our Contributions to Certificate Policy Formalization Our PKI
Policy Repository, PolicyBuilder, and PolicyReporter codify certificate policy
processes used in PKI compliance audits, grid accreditation, and bridging PKIs.
We claim that these tools improve the efficiency and consistency of policy re-
trieval, creation, and comparison. This section presents our contributions in the
context of previous work on the identification, representation, and manipulation
of certificate policies.
Identification Our tools identify certificate policies using a hierarchical,
human-readable, machine-actionable reference string called a Canonical Text
Services Uniform Resource Name (CTS-URN) [29]. CTS-URNs emerge from
some of our previous work on the Multitext of Homer Project [14] to perform
computations on Classical Greek texts [31]. One of this paper’s contributions
is to use CTS-URNs encoded as Object Identifiers (OID)s to identfy individual
CPs, arbitrary sets of policy documents, or other versions or translations of that
same document.
CTS-URNs also identify sets of policy requirements organized within a cita-
tion (or reference) scheme. RFC 3647, Section 6 [12] explicitly defines a citation
scheme organized in terms of policy requirements to facilitate the comparison of
CPs and CPSs. CTS-URNs enable the tools we built to compute with respect to
a policy’s reference structure, identifying individual security provisions1 or the
document in its entirety.
Our identification scheme increases the expressiveness of policy related cer-
tificate extensions by encoding CTS-URNs as OIDs. Accepting or rejecting CPs
is currently a binary decision; policy documents must be “completely accepted
or forbidden” [21]. CTS-URNs let people and machines reference arbitrary sec-
tions of a policy; rather than accepting or rejecting an entire policy document,
users may whitelist or blacklist agreeable or offending provisions.
Representation We encode certificate policies using Text Encoding Initiative
(TEI) P5 Lite, an XML standard for representing texts in digital form [5]. Like
previous efforts to encode policies using XML [8] [7], we model a security policy
as a tree.2 Given a policy’s text, we only mark up its citation scheme, the outline
of provisions defined in Section 6 of RFC 3647 or Section 5 of RFC 2527 [11]. This
results in a semi-formal [7] policy representation that is both machine-actionable
and human-readable. This approach simplifies the overhead of encoding a policy.
The Federal PKI Policy Authority (FPKIPA) Technical Specification recom-
mends writing CPs and CPSs in a natural language [12]. Our representation
honors that recommendation and leaves the natural language of the policy un-
changed. Alternate representations of policies such as data-centric XML3, matri-
ces, or ASN.1 require a person to read the source text and fit their interpretation
of that text to a data format. Such representations are unsuitable for relying par-
ties to easily understand the meaning of a policy [7] [16] [12]. Our contribution
is a policy representation that humans can use as a primary source for informed
policy decisions and which computers can process.
Manipulation Computing on certificate policies overcomes many of the
drawbacks and limitations of manual processes. We claim that implementations
of algorithms are efficient and consistent processes for explicitly imposing a
model on policy content. Algorithms may be run frequently. Unlike deriving a
model of policy content from text and encoding it by hand, algorithms can be
run on demand any time as CPs change. Algorithms are unambiguous and when
their implementations are open-source, the underlying process is transparent to
the user. Finally, the output of algorithms may be reproduced by running the
same input and interpreted to make informed trust decisions.
1 Trcek et. al’s DNS-like system organized the set of all possible security requirements hierarchically into domains
that were referenced by human-readable, machine-actionable strings [33].
2 Our approach is inspired by current approaches to digitizing Classical texts [14] [13].
3 Document-centric XML is the type of documents “written by hand, by an author” like a letter or chapter. Data-centric
XML is used to transport data between computers [27].
This Paper This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some
real-world use cases for certificate policy and the reliability of current practices.
Section 3 introduces the design and implementation of the tools we built for
processing certificate policy and illustrates how they address real-world needs
while improving actual practice. We evaluate these tools in Section 4, using
anecdotal and experimental evidence. Section 5 reviews related work. Section
6 describes future research directions building upon this work, and Section 7
concludes.
2 Problems with Manual Certificate Policy Processes
Certificate policy defines the trustworthiness of a CA and therefore is funda-
mental to the trust one places in a PKI. This section discusses three real-world
X.509 processes which directly use certificate policy: PKI compliance audits,
IGTF accreditation, and policy mapping for bridging PKIs. In each case, we’ll
describe the process in principle and its importance to the trustworthiness of a
PKI. Then we’ll describe how the current implementation of this process limits
trustworthiness and motivate the need for consistent operations on certificate
policies.
PKI Compliance Audits Like accreditation processes, PKI audits verify
that the certificate policies and certification practice statements are consistent
with a “framework of requirements.” In the financial services industry, ISO 21188
specifies such a framework that evolved from WebTrust and ANSI X9.79 [22].
Audits for WebTrust compliance should occur at least every 6 months [15]. Dur-
ing these audits, PKIs are evaluated with respect to five objectives: security,
availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy. Each of these objec-
tives are defined using principles, “broad statements of objectives,” and criteria,
“benchmarks that should be objective, measurable, complete, and relevant” [34].
Through Assurance Services, a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) may express
a WebTrust opinion on whether an objective is met. By keeping objective obser-
vations separate from opinion, WebTrust audits are an important and objective
process for certifying that actual practice reflects written policy. Additionally,
the International Collaborative Identity Management Forum (ICIDM) and Four
Bridges Forum (4BF) [1] are working to define a standard PKI audit process.
The IGTF also publishes a set of auditing guidelines [32].
Frequency Compliance audits are expensive in time and money, and lim-
ited by the bottleneck of human observation. Although compliance audits like
WebTrust are supposed to occur at least every 6 months, in actual practice
they usually happen less often. Even when these audits occur on schedule, au-
ditors’ observations only sample a glimpse of much larger, continuous business
processes. By necessity, PKI audits require human intervention; expressing an
opinion based upon observed criteria requires human judgement. However, the
criteria themselves, measureable and objective by definition, do not require hu-
man judgement to measure.
Transparency Current auditing schemes lack transparency. Users cannot
evaluate an organization’s observed behavior in terms of their own trust require-
ments. Instead users implicitly delegate trust decisions to a CPA or other audit
professional. Furthermore, because ISO 21188 and ANSI X9.79 are not freely
available, the average user has no way of knowing the trust decisions being del-
egated.4 These institutional and economic walls ensure that trust evaluation
resides at the organizational level in spite of trust’s personal nature. Through
combining documentation with computational methods, measurements of trust
criteria could be made accessible to users to individually decide the degree of
trust they place in an organization.
Reproducibility Compliance audits, as currently practiced, are difficult to
reproduce because they are so dependant upon auditors’ individual observations.
Certainly audits attest to an organization’s trustworthiness at the time of the
last audit; however they say nothing about the current state of the organization.
Were an auditor to try to reproduce an audit, the conditions under which the
original audit occurred may be extremely difficult or impossible to reproduce
because organizations are dynamic, changing entities. Audits rely upon the past
as the sole indicator of current and future performance.
IGTF Accreditation Researchers using computational grids employ many
thousands of distributed nodes to solve complex computational problems by
sharing resources. Grids often group users under very large Virtual Organizations
(VOs) which usually reflect real-world collaborations between researchers and
institutions. Computational power, data storage, and network bandwidth all
must be shared between members of a VO. Since these resources are valuable,
access is limited based on the requested resource and the user’s identity. Each
grid must enforce these limits by providing secure authentication of users and
applications. Unauthorized access to resources is unacceptable, especially given
the large size of a VO [26]. The IGTF uses X.509 PKI to ensure that grid
authentication mechanisms meet a defined level of assurance.
A distributed architecture like the grid requires compatible, non-contradictory
policies among member organizations. An IGTF-accredited member should is-
sue policy consistent with all other members, and thereby satisfy the IGTF’s
standard for trust. The purpose of the IGTF is to “harmonize the work on au-
thentication for e-Science production infrastructures.”[18] It accomplishes this
by establishing common policies and guidelines between PMAs as well as ensur-
ing compliance to the resulting Federation Document amongst the participating
PMAs. Currently, the IGTF maintains a set of authentication profiles (AP)
which specify the policy and technical requirements. During accreditation the
prospective member sends the Certificate Policy (CP) around to other members
for comments and asks multiple PMA members to review it in detail. Eventu-
ally this CP, along with recommendations from the reviewers, is presented at
the PMA meeting for immediate approval or deferral.
4 Anecdotally, we believe the costs of ISO 21188 and ANSI X9.79 may discourage organizations from following
these standards in actual practice.
The IGTF defines accreditation in terms of manual procedures, institution-
alizing bottlenecks that might be eliminated through technology. Accreditation
should be defined in terms of functional requirements, not in terms of a particular
implementation of those functions.
Frequency The IGTF’s requirement that any change in policy requires reac-
creditation may penalize organizations that change policy to reflect actual prac-
tice. Since organizational practices change rapidly and policies should reflect
practice, policies need to be able to change rapidly to mirror the actual orga-
nization. So as not to penalize organizations for reporting their actual prac-
tices, reaccreditation should be defined to accommodate frequent organizational
changes. Furthermore, when the IGTF changes an AP, all members have just 6
months to re-certify that they are compliant with the new profile.
Transparency Users authenticating to the grid are unable to see for them-
selves how well member institutions satisfy APs and are implicitly forced to
trust IGTF accreditation. While users may not be able to learn every nuance
of an accreditation process, the evidence leading to an accreditation should be
readily available to grid users. All members are equally trusted under the current
scheme. In reality some of them may satisfy the AP or portions of the AP better
than others. Grid authentication will only be as strong as its weakest member.
Reproducibility Since IGTF accreditation is defined in terms of a manual
process, reproducing or auditing an accreditation decision is difficult. Members
review a CP in private and then present their findings at an IGTF meeting. The
process places much burden on volunteers who may not have much experience
in the accreditation process. These reviewers then present their own opinions
on the compatibility of the CP with the federation’s AP. Since CPs are large
documents, other IGTF members may trust the reviewers’ opinion rather than
reading the CP on their own. While reviewers’ opinions determine much of the
accreditation decision, the criteria used in forming that opinion may not be
captured for future reference.
Policy Mapping for Bridging PKIs Bridge CAs, though not themselves
anchors of trust, establish relationships with different PKIs so that users from
different PKIs can decide whether to trust one another. Bridges exist to mediate
trust in several areas including the pharmaceutical industry, the U.S. Federal
government (FPKIPA), the defense and aerospace industry, and higher education
(HEBCA). Creation of these bridges requires mapping policies between member
PKIs. When a new organization wishes to join a bridge, the bridge CA will
compare the candidate organization’s CP to its own. If suitable, the bridge CA
will then sign the certificate of the candidate organization’s trust root. Sometimes
a bridge CA may even use the policy mapping certificate extension to establish
an equivalence between a member organization’s policy and one of its own CPs.
Frequency Policy mapping occurs when an organization first requests to
join a bridge and becomes invalid when actual practice changes. The timelines
over which written policy, policy mapping, and actual practice change are not
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Fig. 1. System architecture for our certificate policy framework. (Dashed modules not
yet implemented)
changes. As such, diligent organizations keeping their policy statement up to
date pose a challenge to bridge CAs who must manually map a member CP into
their own. If the policy of the bridge CA changes, it may be important to know
how well the CPs of member organizations satisfy the new policy.
Transparency The actual evidence used to decide whether an organization
belongs to a bridge is not readily available to its users. Without this evidence,
users know whether or not an organization meets the bridge requirements but
do not know the extent to which those requirements are met.
Reproducibility Policy mapping in actual practice does not distinguish be-
tween expressed opinion and criterion; there is no way to easily reproduce or
evaluate the mapping process for relying parties. Although the policy mapping
claimed by the bridge CA may be documented in a certificate extension, these
mappings only reference entire policy documents and as such are unsuitable for
reconstructing the evidence for membership in a bridge. Mapping matrices are
used to document CP compliance, but these are not typically available to the
relying party.
3 Computational Tools: Design and Implementation
We designed and implemented the PKI Policy Repository, PolicyBuilder, and
PolicyReporter to improve the efficiency and consistency of policy retrieval,
creation, and comparison. Each of these tools rests upon our formalization of
certificate policy: we identify and reference policy via CTS-URNs and repre-
sent policy in TEI-XML. Each tool fully or partially automates one or more
of the policy operations and improves their frequency, transparency, and repro-
ducibility. These tools will be released in an open source distribution following
publication. Figure 1 illustrates the design and implementation of the tools we
will now consider. For each tool, we briefly discuss its relevance to the previous
use cases. We then present each of our solutions in the context of current actual
practice and prior research on policy formalization.
PKI Policy Repository The PKI Policy Repository stores certificate
policies for retrieval by their reference structure. PKI audits, accreditation, and
policy mapping depend upon the reference, and retrieval of certificate policies
and yet little work has been done to automate or partially automate these fun-
damental processes. The PKI Policy Repository fills this void, and sets the stage
for individuals to access and evaluate certificate policy.
Reference We extended OIDs to cover the entirity of a certificate policy’s
reference structure. Furthermore we implemented a bidirectional mapping from
a machine-actionable OID to a human-readable and machine-actionable CTS-
URN. Certificate policies are reference works by design. The ability to reference
these policies motivated RFC 3647, its predecessor 2527, and a parallel refer-
ence structure (or citation scheme) in Certification Practice Statements (CPSs).
Policy comparison proceeds much more quickly between two policies sharing the
same reference structure. Bridge CAs attest to the trustworthiness of PKIs by
listing references to equivalent CPs in the policy mapping extension. Unfortu-
nately the OIDs they use only reference the entire certificate policy, causing
shallow, very coarse policy mappings. In actual practice, people are interested in
referencing meaningful sets of security requirements. This is why policies have a
reference structure in the first place! Trcek et al.’s DNS-like system used machine-
actionable, human-readable references to security policy domains, allowing one
to reference meaningful sets of security requirements [33]. RFC 3647 and 2527
define meaningful sets of security requirements through the reference structure.
We also encoded CTS-URNs as OIDs for referencing arbitrary sets of certifi-
cate policies, as well as different editions and translations of the same Certificate
Policy. Compliance audits, grid accreditation, and bridging PKIs all attest to the
trustworthiness of a CP at a particular point in time. Since policies change over
time, we claim such attestations should reference the version of the policy at the
time of the audit. In prior work, Grimm proposed using multiple versions of the
same policy, one expressed formally for machines to process and one expressed
informally for administrators to understand its meaning [16]. Although our pol-
icy is semi-formal, it would be possible to treat other policies–such as Casola et
al.’s highly-structured XML [8] [7] and perhaps even ASN.1 representations–as
versions of a policy which can be referenced. Since code is text, we can even
reference code claiming consistency with a certificate policy provision as if it
were another version of that provision. Using OID-encoded CTS-URNs allow
multiple versions of a policy, whether plain text, XML, or code to be uniformly
referenced through a parallel citation scheme. This accomplishes Grimm’s idea
of associating an implementable part of security policy with the “set of specified
security measures” realized by the implemented security functions [16].
Retrieval Retrieving referenced sections of security policy traditionally in-
volves turning printed pages or scrolling through a PDF. Given a reference to a
CP such as section 7.1, a CA typically browses his file system to the appropriate
PDF, opens it and then scrolls through it until he gets to the appropriate sec-
tion. Even when searching the PDF, results tend to be reported in page numbers.
In actual practice, the mechanisms for policy retrieval are largely unrelated to
the mechanisms for citing (referencing) policy. In prior research on policy for-
malization, little work has been done with policy retrieval. One exception is
PolicyMaker which allows one to query policy actions using a database-like syn-
tax [3].
For digital editions of reference works, we claim that page numbers are an
unnecessary artifact of print. Digitization allows one to navigate texts by logical
reference rather than by page number. The PKI Policy Repository is a Canoni-
cal Text Services (CTS) server5, loaded with certificate policies. The CTS pro-
tocol [30] uses HTTP to provide a simple REST XML web service for retrieving
canonical texts. Users or applications can retrieve sections of policy by supply-
ing a CTS-URN and other HTTP request parameters. The PKI Policy Repos-
itory currently uses a Google AppEngine implementation of CTS, although a
Groovy/Java implementation also exists. Programs may process the XML pol-
icy fragments from a CTS service and transform it into PDF or HTML. This tool
lets CAs query an entire database of policy in terms of how it is traditionally
referenced, saving them from having to manage PDFs or other representations
on their own. Furthermore, this tool opens the door for algorithms to process
the content of certificate policy.
PolicyBuilder The PolicyBuilder assists CAs in creating new policies
from extant ones. In actual practice new certificate policies may be created
when a CA wants to join a federation or bridge. Typically CAs copy and paste
passages of extant policy into their new policy and selectively edit a few words
and phrases as needed. The more similar the new, derivative certificate policy is
to older, already accepted policies, the greater the chances for the new policy to
be accepted. Under these circumstances, policy creation is quickly followed by
policy review. While Klobucar et al. have stated the need for machine-assisted
policy creation [21], no tools have been built to fill this need and none have
emerged that consider policy creation as a means to streamline policy review.
The PolicyBuilder fills the need for machine-assisted policy creation while
facilitating the review and evaluation of newly-created policies. Rather than
copying and pasting policy statements from PDFs, PolicyBuilder imports pol-
icy content directly from CPs in one or more PKI Policy Repositories. More
specifically, the PolicyBuilder initializes an empty reference tree as defined in
RFC 3647 and populates it with corresponding content from selected policies.
Policy content currently includes assertions, or security requirements qualified
by MUST, SHOULD, or other adjectives from RFC 2119. Rather than copying
and pasting content, policy assertions are imported into the new document by
simply clicking on them. Once a document tree is built to satisfaction, the CA
may serialize policy to XML, PDF, or HTML. Since each assertion includes a
CTS-URN to its source policy, CAs can see how many security requirments they
imported from bridge or grid-approved CPs. Similarly, reviewers can process
the XML and measure how much content is original and how much comes from
already-approved policies.
PolicyReporter The PolicyReporter helps users obtain more, higher-
quality information useful for comparing certificate policies. Although policy
comparison is a fundamental operation in bridging PKIs and grid accreditation,
it remains a highly-manual, highly-subjective process, making it difficult to per-
form consistently. People compare two CPs at a time, line-by-line, evaluating
5 Again, we helped to develop the CTS Protocol for serving Classical texts in the Multitext of Homer Project [14].
their similarity. For a person with a lot of experience, this can take 80-120 hours
depending upon the reference structure of the policies compared. The hardest
comparisons include policies with non-standard reference schemes.
Prior work in machine-assisted policy comparison encompasses a variety of
techniques ranging from using fuzzy theory on highly-formal policy representa-
tions [7] to imposing a partial or full order on specific values in policy content [21].
Still others organize sets of security requirements into a tree and compare poli-
cies by looking at where they sit within the tree [33]. However none of these
approaches automatically process the texts as they were designed to be com-
pared, by reference structure. Certainly not all policies follow RFC 3647 neatly
or even at all [28]. However our work illustrates further benefit to following RFC
3647 or even 2527, for it allows a standard set of analyses for comparing CPs to
develop.
The PolicyReporter aggregates information about a set of policy provisions
(the criteria for comparison) into a report by walking the citation structure6
of each text. Given a reference to a policy, it queries one or more PKI Pol-
icy Repositories, retrieves the referenced content, and processes it using some
algorithm. The results of these algorithms are either human-readable HTML
report or an XML document. Although PolicyReporter currently operates on
semi-formal source texts, it could just as easily analyze other, more structured
interpretations of the source like the markup proposed by Casola et al. Our im-
mediate goal is to help CAs find large discrepancies between CPs such as the
number of security requirements of a certain significance.
Currently three algorithms for extracting information from certificate policies
are implemented for the PolicyReporter.
RFC 2119 Analysis The RFC2119Analyzer counts the number of occur-
rences of words in one of three categories defined in RFC 2119 [4] to indicate
the significance of a requirement. Policy statements with the highest importance
contain the words MUST, REQUIRED, or SHALL, the next most important
provisions contain SHOULD or RECOMMENDED, and the least significant re-
quirements use MAY or OPTIONAL.
Since security provisions in CPs use RFC 2119-like language, counting the
number of words in each category indicates how strictly a section of certificate
policy needs to be followed. Interpreting the results of this analysis is simple. A
large difference in these counts indicates discrepancies in the requirement levels
of two sections of policy.
RFC 2527 Policy Mapper The RFC 2527 Policy Mapper takes a section
of text from an RFC 2527 certificate policy and automatically maps it into
RFC 3647 TEI-XML. Every mapped provision contains a reference to its source
policy. The generated RFC 3647 policy can then be loaded into the PKI Policy
Repository and used like any other document.
Source Text Analysis The SourceTextAnalyzer leaves the retrieved passage
unchanged. This operation is useful for arbitrarily aggregating sections of the
6 The FPKIPA recommends all members use 3647 format for all cross-certified CPs [2].
policy. This analyzer may be used to assist auditors. For example, WebTrust au-
ditors must evaluate “the procedures to add new users, modify the access level
of existing users, and remove users who no longer need access” [34]. Extracting
the content from CP sections7 pertaining to issuing new certificates (RFC 3647,
Section 3.1), revocation requests (3.4), certificate issuance (4.3), and certificate
modification (4.8) would quickly provide auditors with relevant policy infor-
mation. Other reports could give an overview of PKI processes, or aggregate
information on user enrollment [28].
4 Evaluation
This section demonstrates that our tools, in particular the PolicyReporter, actu-
ally address current limitations of compliance audits, IGTF accreditation, and
policy mapping. Empirical results are combined with anecdotal evidence to argue
improvements in the efficiency and consistency of certificate policy operations
in actual practice.
Our experimental evaluations compare the duration of two common certifi-
cate policy operations when performed manually and when using our PolicyRe-
porter. The first experiment measures the time needed to aggregate information
used to compare two CPs while the second measures the time needed to map
a policy from 2527 format into 3647 format. Our hypothesis is that the auto-
mated processes take less time and provide better-quality information than the
non-automated processes.
Experiment 1: Aggregating Information for Policy Comparison The
first experiment assumes that the policies being compared are readily available
on disk in PDF format for the manual case and are sitting in the PKI Policy
Repository as TEI-XML in the automated case. Since comparing policies is sub-
jective and varies widely across CAs, we decided to measure the time required
to aggregate the information needed to perform a comparison. Additionally, we
used a highly-experienced certificate authority operator so that we could com-
pare our approach to the fastest manual times possible. In the automated case,
we timed the steps necessary to generate a report using the SourceTextAnalysis
and RFC2119Analysis and to view each of the sections in that report. In the
manual case, we timed the steps needed to load the two PDFs, position them,
and view each of the sections in that report side by side. We also timed how
long it took to manually count the words appearing in RFC 2119. Since the
steps done to perform these tasks may vary from person to person, we explicitly
defined each of the steps to be followed.
We performed ten time trials to control for variables which could affect the
time necessary to collect the information specified by the evaluation criteria8.
More policy units (p-units), defined as passages of depth 3 within the policy’s
citation tree (such as Section 3.1.4), within the criteria will require more in-
formation to be collected and potentially require more time. The length of the
7 We are assuming the CP is structured according to RFC 3647 in this example.
8 In this context, criteria consist of the policy sections to be compared and the algorithms to run on them.



















































































































MAY MUST MUST MUST SHALL
0 2 9 30 9
1 0 10 22 10
Table 2. Discrepancies in manual and automated RFC 2119 keyword counts
policy unit passages will affect how long it takes to analyze the text. The prox-
imity of passages within a policy will affect how much a person or machine must
navigate through the text. Finally, since the time it takes to manually gather
this information decreases with experience, we had a very experienced subject
perform the manual and automated tasks. Tables 1 and 2 display the times for
each trial and the accuracy of the RFC 2119 key word counts respectively.
The timing and counting results reveal a great deal about the efficiency
of manual versus automated certificate policy operations. An initial glance at
trials 8, 9, and 10 in the timing data reveals that the speed of consolidating
information for policy reviews depends less on the number of unit policies to
compare and more upon the proximity of those passages to one another in the
text. We suspect that the length of the policy unit passages will affect the time
required to actually compare the passages, though that is out of the scope of this
experiment. Additionally notice that the times to view each passage manually
are significantly less than those required to view and count the RFC 2119 words.
This indicates that machine-actionable policy comparison makes it possible to
gather useful information, such as the significance of a policy requirement, for
making policy decisions that are intractible using current methods. Overall the
automated policy comparison saved our CP analyst 5 minutes (39%) of his time
when he was just viewing passages, and 44 minutes (84%) of his time when
working more closely with the material by counting keywords.
Efficiency is also a function of accuracy. In this experiment we measured
the accuracy of manual versus automated comparison of policy using in terms
of the RFC 2119 Analysis. Table 2 shows that manual and automatic methods
disagreed with each other in 50% of the trials. In trials 4 and 7, our CP analyst
missed 1 occurrence of a keyword. In trial 8, our CP analyst counted requires
as belonging to the required category while our algorithm did not. This example
highlights how encoding such textual analyses resolves subtle differences in eval-
uation that occur in manual policy comparison. Finally in trial 10, although our
subject missed a MUST occurrence in section 5.3 of the ULAGrid policy, our
analyzer missed a number of occurrences as Section 3.1.4 of the TACC policy
refers to Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. Future versions of PolicyReporter will have to
resolve such references.
Overall however these results indicate that automated PKI operations are
more efficient. Additional analyses such as the RFC 2119 Analysis that are man-
ually costly but informative take 84% less time and provide better quality in-
formation when automated, allowing these operations to occur more frequently
in a manner that can be reproduced. Since the PolicyReporter generates HTML
reports, the information upon which policy decisions are based can be saved,
leading to more transparency. We have experimentally demonstrated that the
PolicyReporter does make CP comparison more efficient and consistent. We can
only posit how much more efficient automated policy becomes when comparing
dozens of security provisions rather than no more than ten at a time. Further-
more, the PolicyReporter makes it possible to easily compare more than two
policies at a time whereas current manual operations make such comparisons
impractical.
Experiment 2: Timing Automated Policy Mapping The second ex-
periment makes the same assumptions as the first; PDF policies are available on
disk for the manual case and TEI-XML policies are available in the PKI Pol-
icy Repository in the automated case. The design of the second experiment was
much simpler as we simply timed how long it took to automatically map the set
of policy units in Section 1 of an RFC 2527 policy into the RFC 3647 citation
scheme. We used the mapping defined in RFC 3647 and in three time trials the
PolicyReporter enabled us to complete the mapping in 50, 39, and 35 seconds
respectively.
These results highlight the speed of machine-actionable certificate policy.
In under one minute, policy units from one section of a certificate policy were
automatically mapped. It is estimated that mapping 2527 to 3647 requires 20%
more effort than a direct mapping between 3647 CPs. Considering that the
average mapping takes 80-120 hours, although the comparison is not exact, we
claim that our results indicate a significant time savings in policy mapping.
In preparation for the experiment, automation of the mapping process im-
mediately revealed an error in RFC 3647’s mapping framework: RFC 3647 maps
2527, section 2.1 to 3647, section 2.6.4. A closer look at RFC 3647, Section 6
revealed that section 2.6.4 does not exist in the outline of provisions! Automatic
mapping allows one to easily change a mapping and rerun the process as fre-
quently as desired. Our approach also increases the transparency of the mapping
process because generated RFC 3647 policies contain references to the source
RFC 2527 provisions from which they are mapped. Finally, automatic policy
mapping is easily reproduced; generated policies can be compared to other poli-
cies by loading them into the PKI Policy Repository. It takes roughly 1 minute
to load a policy into the repository depending upon the size of the document.
5 Related Work
Chadwick developed various XML-based Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
authorization policies so that domain administrators and users can manage their
own resources [9] [10]. SAML [6] and XACML [24] formalize authentication and
authorization policies in XML.
Previous work in certificate policy formalization focuses less on human-readable,
machine-actionable representation. Blaze [3], Mendes [23], and Grimm [16] all
use ASN.1 to model properies inferred from the policy’s source text. Others like
Casola [8] [7], have developed data-centric XML representations, suitable for
machines but not for readily understanding policy semantics [16]. Recent work
by Jensen [20] encodes the reference scheme of a certificate policy using Doc-
Book [35]. His work closely relates to our work in policy formalization and is
compatible with our approach.
We reference and compute upon the citation scheme of certificate policies
to drive tools that we have empirically verified to increase the efficiency and
consistency of certificate policy operations. Our work builds upon established
standards and mature technologies. TEI P5 [5] represents 15 years of research
in encoding texts with XML. The CTS Protocol [30] has been in development
for 5 years and is based upon over 20 years of experience [13] in computing with
a variety of digitized texts.9
6 Future Work
In future work, we plan to package our tools for release in an open source distri-
bution hosted at OpenCA Research Labs [25]. Most urgently we need to extend
the automated policy mapping to include all security provisions, not just policy
units in Section 1. Our first experiment also revealed the need to extend the
tools to resolve references to other sections of text that occur within a policy
statement.
In general this work sets the stage for two complimentary problems: extracting
useful information from natural language policies and designing usable certificate
policies for man and machine. For the former problem, we intend to design, build,
and test additional algorithms for processing policy text. Just as we filtered for
RFC 2119 key words, so could we filter phrases indicating the size of the CA key
in Section 6.1.5 or extract SHA-2 hash requirements. We also may investigate
more sophisticated Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms. Algorithmic
analyses of a policy’s source text may lay the foundation for usable security
policy metrics with real-world utility.
Computing on certificate policies informs the design of security policies that
can be processed by human and computer. Certificate policies encoded in XML
formats like TEI and DocBook are currently compatible with the PKI Policy
Repository. However, other texts such as configuration files or code intended to
9 We used this experience in designing the CTS Protocol, requiring compatibility with texts encoded in TEI,
DocBook, or any other valid XML format encoding a citation scheme.
be consistent with a policy statement might be aligned through the common
citation framework that CTS-URNs provide. Given that high-level policy state-
ments can be mapped into software, we also plan to investigate how they might
be explictly mapped into hardware. Finally, some of Chadwick and Sasse’s re-
search on controlled languages might prove helpful in making policies useable
for humans and computers [10].
7 Conclusions
To conclude, our PKI Policy Repository, PolicyBuilder, and PolicyReporter make
real-world CP operations more efficient and consistent. We have empirically
demonstrated their utility in aggregating information for policy comparison and
policy mapping, two common tasks performed in compliance audits, grid accred-
itation, and bridging PKIs. Our tools streamline these processes, making them
more efficient and provide auditors with more, higher quality information. Our
tools allow people to to specify a set of provisions that mimic how they actu-
ally make trust decisions. Instead of forcing people to accept or reject a policy
in its entirety, CTS-URNs encoded as OIDs allow one to blacklist or whitelist
arbitrary policy provisions. While we hope that our tools will reduce the costs
associated with creating and maintaining a PKI, more importantly we hope to
empower individuals to make their own trust decisions through a usable policy
framework.
References
1. 4BF - Four Bridges Forum. Retrieved May 29, 2009 from http://www.the4bf.
com/.
2. Peter Alterman. Reformatting Entity CP’s into RFC 3647 Format, November
2006. Retrieved May 30, 2009 from http://www.cio.gov/fpkipa/documents/
PolicyMemoRFC3647v1.pdf.
3. M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. Decentralized Trust Management. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 164–173, 1996.
4. S. Bradner. RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,
March 1997.
5. Lou Burnard and Syd Bauman. TEI P5: Guidelines for Electronic Text Encoding
and Interchange. 5th edition, 2007.
6. Scott Cantor, John Kemp, Rob Philpott, and Eve Maler. Assertions and Protocols
for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. 2005.
7. V. Casola, A. Mazzeo, N. Mazzocca, and M. Rak. An Innovative Policy-Based Cross
Certification Methodology for Public Key Infrastructures. In EuroPKI, 2005.
8. V. Casola, A. Mazzeo, N. Mazzocca, and V. Vittorini. Policy Formalization to
Combine Separate Systems into Larger Connected Network of Trust. In Net-Con,
page 425, 2002.
9. David W. Chadwick and Alexander Otenko. RBAC Policies in XML for X.509
Based Privilege Management. In SEC, page 39, 2002.
10. David W. Chadwick and A. Sasse. The Virtuous Circle of Expressing Authorization
Policies. In Semantic Web Policy Workshop, 2006.
11. S. Chokhani and W. Ford. RFC 2527: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, March 1999.
12. S. Chokhani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu. RFC 3657: Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Frame-
work, November 2003.
13. Gregory Crane. The Perseus Digital Library. Retrieved May 29, 2009 from http:
//www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
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